
















ABSTRACT: The bargaining process and its role in price discovery
within the Paciﬁc Northwest asparagus industry is analyzed using a
general empirical bargaining model. Growers’ and processors’ inverse
supply and demand functions deﬁne boundaries for the negotiated
prices. OLS and Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedures are used
to estimate a stochastic bargaining model of price determination. The
results indicate that basic supply and demand forces exert substantial
inﬂuences on the bargaining process. In particular, expected levels of
supply play a paramount role in the level of prices offered, while past
prices also inﬂuence current offers. The general framework of analysis
used in relation to asparagus can be generalized to other commodities
where bargaining plays a role in price discovery. The model can be used
to investigate the extent to which major economic forces impact
bargaining behavior.
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Increasing concentration in food processing has led to fewer buyers of raw
agricultural commodities and heightened interest in grower bargaining associa-
tions. Ignoring the dairy sector, the number of grower cooperatives involved in
bargaining has increased from 40 in 1987 to 54 in 1996 (USDA, 1998).
A case in point is the asparagus industry. Asparagus is sold by growers for
either fresh or processed uses. The price of fresh asparagus is determined by the
concurrent interaction of market supply and demand forces on an on-going basis.
On the other hand, price discovery for most processing asparagus in the United
States is through micro-level negotiation of contract prices between growers’
bargaining associations and processors. The bargaining process is completed prior
to harvest each crop year to establish the price and expected volume of processing
asparagus for the coming season.
The characteristics of the bargaining process suggest that the processed
asparagus market operates within a monopoly/monopsony-like context. The
typical price equilibrium, where supply equals demand, breaks down under such
behavior, as is well-known. In particular, price equilibrium under bargaining not
only depends upon supply and demand forces, but also on the relative bargaining
power of the sellers and buyers.
In the case of the Washington/Oregon asparagus industry, negotiations estab-
lish both the price and the expected volume of processing asparagus for the
upcoming season. At the beginning of each year, the grower’s bargaining
association announces an opening selling price offer based on the growers’
perceptions of asparagus market conditions. Processors provide a response within
three days following the growers’ announcement. The opening price offer
becomes the ﬁnal price for processing asparagus if the majority of processors
agree to accept it. If not, the growers’ bargaining association must make a second
price offer within ﬁve days. The second price offer may or may not be the same
as the ﬁrst. If the second offer is accepted, it becomes the price for processing
asparagus in the coming season. If not, the price of processing asparagus is ﬁnally
determined by an arbitration board. The arbitration board is composed of
representatives of the growers and processors, as well as other members who are
appointed by the states’ departments of agriculture. In practice, either the ﬁrst or
second price offer has always become the ﬁnal price of processing asparagus.
There have been only two years in which the ﬁnal price of processing asparagus
was determined by the arbitration board during the past 30 years, and in both of
these cases, the second price offer of the growers was adopted by the board.
A number of models of the asparagus industry have been analyzed in the
literature. In 1971, French and Matthews formulated a demand-supply equilib-
rium model of the U.S. asparagus industry. Grossman (1973) developed a
structural model of the asparagus industry at a regional level. Hoos and Runsten
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grower prices for processing asparagus in California. In 1982, a structural
econometric model for the U.S. asparagus industry was developed by Bbuyemu-
soke, et al. (1982), and still another econometric model of the U.S. asparagus
industry was developed by French and Willett (1989). However, none of these
past models contained an explicit analysis of the bargaining component of
processed price determination.
Previous studies relating to bargaining may be broadly classiﬁed into two
categories: the general economic theory of bargaining and models of bargaining
in speciﬁc industry contexts. Bowley (1928) was one of the ﬁrst researchers to
analyze the economic theoretic underpinnings of bargaining, and based his
analysis on the theoretical model of bilateral monopoly. Bowley separated the
bargaining process into two steps. The quantity traded that would maximize proﬁt
was determined ﬁrst. Then the bargained price determined the distribution of the
maximized joint proﬁts. This same theoretical theme appeared in the much more
recent work of Blair and Kaserman (1987), and thus would appear to have
withstood the test of time. Fuller (1963) made theoretical comparisons and
contrasts between bargaining in agriculture and general labor industry markets in
terms of the bargaining nature, type, tactics, and outcomes. He indicated a relative
lack of market power in most agricultural situations.
A number of bargaining models and analyses have been developed that are
related to a number of (non-asparagus) agricultural industries. Helmberger and
Hoos (1963) outlined the essential characteristics of the bargaining participants,
the bargaining environment, and various alternative approaches to bargaining in
agriculture. Hill’s (1966) bargaining model for predicting price adjustments to
technological change established an absolute limit of the bargaining range by
using minimum proﬁts acceptable to the ﬁrms engaged in bargaining. The result
of bargaining within this range was determined in terms of the distribution of
bargaining power between the sellers and the buyers. Babb, Belden, and Saathoff
(1969) analyzed factors affecting the bargaining process and outcome of negoti-
ations for the processing tomato industry in Indiana and Ohio during the 1966
growing season. They found that processors were primarily concerned about
quality factors and growers with price. Ladd (1974) developed a model of a
cooperative that bargains with processors either for maximization of price
received by producers or maximization of quantity of raw materials to be traded.
This led to a representation of a bargaining solution in terms of ﬁrst order
conditions for optimizing the two objectives. A relatively recent bargaining
model was analyzed by French (1987) who developed a framework for farm
price estimation under bargaining applied to the California cling peach
industry.
Previous studies of market power have received increasing attention in both
agricultural and food industries in recent years. Market power is here deﬁned as
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such as levels of prices or quantities in a transaction. Various structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) studies have been conducted to determine the source of
market power, or the major factors affecting market power, and their relation-
ships. A classic example is Brandow (1969), who identiﬁed more than a dozen
sources of market power in the food industry. He also pointed out that proﬁts and
market power were not necessarily associated with each other. Besides SCP
studies, a number of studies developed measures of the degree of market power
in an industry or a market. Of particular interest is the work of Love and
Murniningtyas (1992), who used the principle of proﬁt maximization to deﬁne an
equilibrium condition for noncompetitive markets and provided explicit paramet-
ric tests for measuring the existence of market power. Market power parameters
were jointly estimated based on cost and demand parameters.
The principal objective of this paper is to develop an empirical model for
investigating the extent to which primary market factors affect price offers and
ultimately the ﬁnal price in a bargaining context, and apply the model to the
processed asparagus in the Washington/Oregon asparagus industry. To accom-
plish this objective, an empirical model of the bargaining process that leads to
price offers, and ultimately a ﬁnal negotiated price, is speciﬁed and then
estimated. While the ﬁnal estimated equations apply only to the asparagus
industry, the general bargaining model that leads to the speciﬁcation of the
equations can be applied to other industries in which ﬁnal commodity prices are
determined via a bargaining process.
EMPIRICAL MODEL OF THE BARGAINING PROCESS
Various market equilibrium and disequilibrium situations are possible within the
bargaining context. A standard market equilibrium model can be conceptualized
as containing four essential equations, consisting of a demand equation, a supply
equation, a price equilibrium equation, and a quantity equilibrium equation (Table
1, entry 1). Given the demand and supply equations, if either or both of the price
and quantity equilibrium conditions are violated, market disequilibrium results.
Bargaining can lead to a solution under market disequilibrium, which can be
classiﬁed into three types: 1) quantity bargaining; 2) price bargaining; and 3)
bargaining for both price and quantity (see Table 1, entries 2, 3, and 4,
respectively). This study deals with price bargaining for a given quantity to be
traded, which coincides with the context in which processed asparagus prices are
determined (Table 1, entry 3).
The equilibrium quantity of processing asparagus to be traded is agreed upon
before pricing is established in the processed asparagus industry. Neither the
growers nor the processors are price takers, and both parties have some market or
bargaining power with which to attempt to inﬂuence the price. The growers
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a price on the growers’ supply curve.
There are two basic features of price determination under bargaining that
distinguish it from the typical market equilibrium analysis. First, the equilibrium
price under bargaining cannot be determined by supply and demand equations
alone because the bargaining activities play a role in price determination. Second,
estimation of the usual neoclassical demand and supply equations will be biased
and inconsistent since actual price observations are generally not located on either
the demand or supply curves.
The supply and demand curves can be considered as deﬁning the lower and
upper price boundaries for the price bargaining process, respectively. The
equilibrium price under bargaining for a given quantity to be traded can be
deﬁned as a convex combination of the inverse supply and demand functions
evaluated at the given equilibrium quantity, Q*. We refer to the parameter
deﬁning the convex combination weights as the relative bargaining power
coefﬁcient, a, which takes a value between 0 and 1. Hence, an economic
model of price discovery under bargaining under the current market assump-
tions can be represented by:
Pd 5 Pd(Qd,Z d) Buyer’s Inverse Demand (1)
Ps 5 Ps(Qs,Z s) Seller’s Inverse Supply (2)
Qd 5 Qs 5 Q* Quantity Equilibrium (3)
P* 5 (1 2 a)Ps 1 aPd Price Equilibrium under Bargaining (4)
Table 1. Market Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Situations
1. Market Equilibrium 2. Quantity Disequilibrium
D 5 D(Pd,Z d) Demand D 5 D(Pd,Z d) Demand
S 5 S(Ps,Z s) Supply S 5 S(Ps,Z s) Supply
D 5 S 5 Q* Quantity Equilibrium D Þ S Quantity Bargaining
Pd 5 Ps 5 P* Price Equilibrium Pd 5 Ps 5 P* Price Equilibrium
3. Price Disequilibrium 4. Price and Quantity Disequilibrium
D 5 D(Pd,Z d) Demand D 5 D(Pd,Z d) Demand
S 5 S(Ps,Z s) Supply S 5 S(Ps,Z s) Supply
D 5 S 5 Q* Quantity Equilibrium D Þ S Quantity Bargaining
Pd Þ Ps Price Bargaining Pd Þ Ps Price Bargaining
Pd 5 the buyers’ price; Ps 5 the sellers’ price; S 5 the quantity supplied; D 5 the quantity demanded; P* 5 the bargained or equilibrium
price; Q* 5 the bargained or equilibrium quantity; Zd 5 demand shifters; and Zs 5 supply shifters.
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bargaining; Zd 5 inverse demand shifters; Zs 5 inverse supply shifters; and a 5
coefﬁcient of relative bargaining power. Some implications of various values of
a are as follows:
under monopoly: a 5 1P * 5 Pd
under monopsony: a 5 0P * 5 Ps
under competition: indeterminate P* 5 Pd 5 Ps
under bargaining: a [ (0,1) Ps , P* , Pd
Solving this market equilibrium bargaining model for the ﬁnal bargained price
yields:
P* 5 (1 2 a)Ps (Q*, Zs) 1 a Pd (Q*, Zd) 5 f(Q*, a,Z s,Z d) (5)
For purposes of estimation, represent both the sellers’ inverse supply function
and the buyers’ inverse demand functions in stochastic form as follows:
Ps 5 Ps (Qs,Z s) 1 es 5 fs(X) 1 es Sellers’ inverse supply (6)
Pd 5 Pd (Qd,Z d) 1 ed 5 fd(X)1ed Buyers’ inverse demand (7)
E(es) 5 E(ed) 5 0 Zero mean of error terms (8)
where es and ed are the disturbance terms for the inverse supply and demand
functions, respectively. Henceforth to simplify notation we let X represent a
universal set of explanatory variables affecting supply and demand and we treat
the parameters as being implicit in the representation of these functions and in
other functions below. Some of the entries in X will then be ghosts in either the
demand or supply functions. All other variables retain their earlier deﬁnitions.
First-Round Bargaining
Since the sellers’ opening offer will be above their supply curve if they are not
price-takers, the sellers’ opening or ﬁrst price offer, say Ps,1, can be represented
as the inverse supply function plus some positive increment DPs,1 which is related
to the sellers’ perceptions of market conditions and bargaining strength, as:
Ps,1 5 [Ps 1 DPs,1] 1 es,1 (9)
5 [fs(X) 1 es] 1 [Dfs,1(X) 1 Des,1] 1 es,1
5 [fs(X) 1 Dfs,1 (X)] 1 [es 1 Des,1 1 es,1]
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where E[e* s,1] 5 0, and fs,1 (X) represents the expectation of the sellers’ ﬁrst price
offer.
In making a decision regarding the acceptability of any price offer, buyers must
have a threshold price in mind. If the sellers’ offer is less than or equal to this
threshold, the buyers will accept the price offer. If the offer is higher, the buyers
will reject it. The buyers’ threshold price, Pd,1, can be deﬁned as the buyers’
inverse demand, Pd, less an increment, DPd,1, that is a function of the buyers’
perceptions about market conditions and bargaining strength, as:
Pd,1 5 [Pd 2 DPd,1] 1 ed,1 (10)
5 [fd(X) 1 ed] 2 [Dfd,1(X) 1 Ded,1] 1 ed,1
5 [fd(X) 2 Dfd,1(X) 1 [ed 2 Ded,1 1 ed,1]
5 fd,1(X) 1 e* d,1
where E[e* d,1] 5 0, and fd,1 (X) is the expectation of the buyers’ threshold price.
The difference between the sellers’ ﬁrst price offer and the buyers’ threshold
price, Y* 1 can be used to characterize the outcome of price bargaining at the ﬁrst
stage. The criterion function for the bargaining outcome will be:
Y* 1 5 Ps,1 2 Pd,1 5 [fs,1(X) 2 fd,1(X)] 1 [es,1 2 ed,1] 5 f1 (X) 1 e* 1 (11)
where E(e* 1) 5 0. If Y* 1 # 0, which implies Ps,1 # Pd,1, then the buyers accept the
sellers’ opening price offer and the bargaining process ends with a bargained price
of P* 5 Ps,1. The ﬁnal price, P*, can then be represented as:
P* 5 Ps,1 5 fs,1(X) 1 e* s,1 (12)
The criterion variable Y* 1 is unobservable since the buyers’ threshold price is
not made public. However, information about the buyers’ decision during the
bargaining process is available in terms of the growers’ price offers, the buyers’
acceptance or rejection decision, and the ﬁnal bargained price. Thus, whether the
ﬁnal price equals Ps,1 or not can be modeled via a limited dependent variable
procedure by deﬁning an observed indicator variable Y as:
Y 5 0i f Y * 1 # 0 f the offer Ps,1 was accepted (13)
Y 5 1i f Y * 1 . 0 f the offer Ps,1 was rejected.
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If Y* 1 . 0, so that Ps,1 . Pd,1, then the buyers will reject the sellers’ opening
price offer. In this case, the bargaining process will continue and the seller must
make a second price offer in order to reach a price agreement. Viewing the sellers’
second price offer as an adjustment to his or her ﬁrst price offer, it can be
expressed as the sellers’ supply price plus an adjustment increment that is
assumed to be less than or equal to the increment added to Ps in the previous offer.
Ps,2 5 [Ps 1 DPs,2] 1 es,2 (14)
5 [fs(X) 1 es] 1 [Dfs,2(X) 1 Des,2] 1 es,2
5 [fs(X) 1 Dfs,2(X) 1 [es 1 Des,2 1 es,2]
5 fs,2(X) 1 e* s,2
where E[e* s,2] 5 0 and Y* 1 . 0.
Similarly, the buyers’ second threshold price can be deﬁned as an adjustment
of the ﬁrst-round threshold price. It can be represented as the buyers’ demand
price less an increment that is assumed to be greater than or equal to the increment
in the previous threshold price function, as:
Pd,2 5 [Pd 2 DPd.2] 1 ed,2 (15)
5 [fd(X) 1 ed] 2 [Dfd,2(X) 1 Ded,2] 1 ed,2
5 [fd(X) 2 Dfd,2(X) 1 [ed 2 Ded,2 1 ed,2]
5 fd,2 (X) 1 e* d,2
where E[e* d,2] 5 0 and Y* 1 . 0.
While it is impossible to know if there is any change in the buyers’ threshold
price during the bargaining process since the threshold price cannot be observed,
it is reasonable to assume that the buyers will consider adjusting their threshold
price based on previous bargaining outcomes. If the buyers’ second threshold
price is the same as the ﬁrst in the bargaining process, then DPd,2 5D Pd,1, and the
threshold price will be:
Pd,2 5 Pd,1 5 fd,1(X) 1 e* d,1 (16)
The criterion function for the second round price negotiation can be deﬁned as
the difference between the sellers’ second price offer and the buyers’ second
threshold price:
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If Y* 2 . 0, so that Ps,2 . Pd,2, then the buyer will reject the sellers’ second price
offer. In this case, the price discovery process continues. In the particular case of
the Washington/Oregon asparagus industry, a ﬁnal price will be determined by an
arbitration board based on the sellers’ second price offer, the buyers’ response to
that offer, and perceptions of market conditions. If Y* 2 # 0, then the sellers’
second price offer will be accepted and the ﬁnal price will be the sellers’ second
price offer, given by equation (14).
In the empirical application of the bargaining model in this study, it can be
assumed that the ﬁnal price resulting from the bargaining process is either the
sellers’ ﬁrst or second price offer in view of the fact that the bargaining process
for processing asparagus has always resulted in at most two different price
possibilities in each year. Based on this assumption, the particular speciﬁcation of
the empirical bargaining model of price discovery for the processing asparagus
situation is given by
Ps,1 5 fs,1(X) 1 e* s,1 E( e* s,1) 5 0 (18)
Ps,2 5 fs,2(X) 1 e* s,2 E( e* s,2) 5 0, given Y* 1 5 f1 (X) 1 e* 1 . 0
P* f 5 (1 2 d)P s,1 1 d Ps,2
where d is an indicator variable deﬁned so that d 5 0 when the sellers’ ﬁrst price
offer is accepted and d 5 1 if the second offer is accepted.
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE BARGAINING MODEL
The sellers’ ﬁrst offer equation can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
using all of the available observations on growers’ ﬁrst offers. The second offer
equation violates standard OLS assumptions because of the obvious censoring
problem that underlies its speciﬁcation. On the other hand, the sellers’ second
price offer equation meets the general conditions of Heckman’s (1976) two-stage
estimation procedure. In particular, assuming multivariate normality of distur-
bances, the expected value of the seller’s second offer can be represented as
(recall equation (11))
E(Ps,2?(Y* 1 . 0) 5 fs,2(X) 1 E(e* s,2?e* 1 . 2f1(X))
5 fs,2(X) 1 t(f/F)
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the standard normal distribution evaluated at the point -f1(X)/s, and t is the
covariance between e* 1 and e* s,2. The estimation of the seller’s second offer
equation then proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, a probit model is ﬁt to
dichotomous observations indicating whether or not the ﬁrst offer was
accepted, and is based on the full universal set of explanatory variables, X.
Then the predicted Mill’s ratios (f/F) from the probit model are used as an
additional explanatory variable in estimating the seller’s second offer equation
via least squares. Thus, Heckman’s two-step procedure is implemented in
estimating the seller’s second offer equation.
Based on annual time series data from 1960 to 1994 on price offers and
acceptances, the estimated equations for the asparagus growers’ ﬁrst and second
price offers are (t-ratios are in parentheses):
PPW1t 5 5.9 2 0.1 AWt 2 0.02 SPUt-1 1 0.13 PFUt-1 1 0.72 PPUt-1 (20)
(22.7) (21.7) (2.7) (3.5)
R
2 5 0.93, Durbin Watson (d) 5 1.8, Std. Error of the Estimate 5 1.4
PPW2t 5 35.0 2 1.03 AWt 2 0.12 SPUt-1 1 0.17 PFUt-1 2 0.88 PPUt-1 (21)




2 5 0.89, Durbin Watson (d) 5 1.7, Std. Error of the Estimate 5 1.0
where,
AWt 5 Bearing acreage of asparagus for the coming season in
Washington/Oregon;
SPUt-1 5 Previous year’s ending stock of U.S. processed asparagus;
PFUt-1 5 Previous year’s U.S. price of fresh asparagus;
PPUt-1 5 Previous year’s U.S. price of processing asparagus;
PPWt 5 The ﬁnal price of processing asparagus in Washington/Oregon;
and
Millst 5 Mills ratio correction term in the Heckman two-step procedure.
The probit equation underlying the generation of the Mills’ ratio correction in
the seller’s second offer equation is given by:
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* 5 24.13 1 .15 AWt 1 .032 SPUt-1 1 .012 PFUt-1 2 .05 PPUt-1
(1.3) (1.5) (.22) (2.5)
LRT (4 df) 5 6.84, Craig-Uhler R
2 5 .25, Correct Predictions 5 67%
DISCUSSION
The signs of the coefﬁcients on AWt and SPUt-1 are negative in the ﬁrst price offer
equation estimated, indicating that the larger the current bearing acreage and
carry-in stocks, the lower the price offer for processing asparagus will be. This is
consistent with the notion that the bargaining strength of growers is eroded when
supplies for the current market period are expected to be high. The perception of
a diminished bargaining position is translated into a reduction in the initial price
offer issued by growers. A positive sign is associated with the effects of both
PPUt-1 and PFUt-1. This is consistent with the notion that growers’ expectations
of current period prices for fresh and processed asparagus are extrapolated from
their most recent experience. Higher price expectations for either fresh or
processed asparagus induce growers to issue higher initial price offers.
The interpretations of the signs of the effects of AWt, SPUt-1, and PFIt-1 on the
level of the second price offer by growers is analogous to the preceding
interpretations in the case of the ﬁrst price offer. Namely, expectations of higher
asparagus supplies lead to lower levels of second price offers, while expectations
of higher fresh market prices lead to higher second price offers. The negative sign
on PPUt-1 was not anticipated, and indicates that at the second stage of the
bargaining process, higher processed asparagus prices in the previous year
induces lower values for growers’ second price offer. The mills ratio is signiﬁcant
and has a negative effect, suggesting that the self-selection correction is relevant
and that the relationship between disturbances in the probit and second price offer
equations is negative, which makes intuitive sense.
Based on one-sided t tests, all of the t values for the explanatory variables in
the econometric model are statistically signiﬁcant at the level of a 5 0.05. Thus,
the variables in the model can be considered as having signiﬁcant inﬂuences on
the offer prices for processing asparagus formulated during the bargaining
process.
The estimated coefﬁcients of the probit model indicate that the probability of
the bargaining process going beyond the ﬁrst round increases as expected supplies
increase, which relates to increasing values of AWt and SPUt-1. This is consistent
with the bargaining process between growers and processors becoming more
contentious when high expected supplies place downward pressure on asparagus
prices. The coefﬁcient on lagged prices are notably insigniﬁcant, although the
signs of the estimated coefﬁcients themselves suggest that it is more likely that the
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are high and processed asparagus prices are low, which is sensible.
While the implications of the estimated probit equation are consistent with
expectations, the model ﬁt is considerably less than desirable. The likelihood ratio
test (LRT) on the signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables has a probability value
of .13, which is not signiﬁcant by the conventional .05 or .10 signiﬁcance level
standards and the ability of the model to predict an extended bargaining situation
is disappointing. It is evident that factors beyond those included in the model exert
important inﬂuences on the bargaining process.
CONCLUSIONS
The empirical bargaining model of price discovery applied to the Washington/
Oregon Asparagus Industry identiﬁed a number of broad market indicators that
exerted important inﬂuences on the bargaining process leading to an equilibrium
processed asparagus price. Expected levels of supplies played a notable role in the
levels of price offers throughout the bargaining process, and also appeared to
inﬂuence whether the bargaining process required more than one round to
complete. Past prices of asparagus in the fresh and processed markets also
inﬂuenced price offers, but their affect on extending the bargaining process was
unclear.
Overall, it was found that broad market indicators explained a substantial
amount of the variation in both price offers and ﬁnal bargained price. The results
of the model also suggest that other factors beyond broad market indicators
inﬂuence the bargaining process, the most notable deﬁciency being in the
explanation of the process leading to an extension of the bargaining process
beyond the ﬁrst round of negotiations.
While the estimated equation presented in this research are applicable only to
the asparagus industry, the general model can be applied to other commodities
where bargaining plays a dominant role in price discovery. The major economic
factors that inﬂuence the behavior of the participants would be the basis of the
speciﬁcation of the price offer equations.
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